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Abstract
Analysis of vote distributions using current tools from statistical physics is of
increasing interest. While data considered for physics studies are subject to
a careful understanding of error sources, such analysis are almost absent in
studies of voting process. As a way to test reliability in electoral processes we
choose to investigate the July 2006 presidential election in Mexico. We use
records which appeared in the Programa de Resultados Preliminares, PREP,
the program which offers electoral results as soon as they are captured. In
order to contrast the results we used the congressional election data-set and
the July 2000 presidential record. We demonstrate the existence of correla-
tions in the percentage of votes and, we offer evidence of the strong influence
of the PRI in the curious results in the presidential case. Distributions of
errors in the data-sets are analyzed for all the elections and no large devi-
ations were found. That is, even when the sum of errors is around 45% in
all cases, their global behavior is similar. This result gives support to the
thesis of no large fraud for the July 2006 presidential election. Distribution
of votes in all cases is obtained for all the parties. Parties and candidates
with few votes, annulled votes and non-registered candidates follow a power
law distribution, and the corporate party follows a daisy model distribution.
Parties and candidates with many votes show a mixed behavior.
Key words: vote distribution, election, opinion dynamics, error analysis,
election forensics
PACS: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.-k
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1. Introduction
Elections are an important matter for humanity. Analysis of how we vote
is an important subject in political, social and economical sciences. In recent
year, physicists and mathematicians became interested in looking if some of
the dynamics and universal behaviors found in statistical mechanics, complex
systems and other fields can be used to understand the voting process and
the way we form our opinion. Such an area has its own name: sociophysics.
The book of Ph. Ball [Ball, 2004] offers a clear and readable introduction to
the physicists’ and mathematicians’ incursion in social and economical sub-
jects, meanwhile the report [Castellano et al, 2009] is a much more technical
approach.
In this context, several theoretical models have been successfully applied
in order to explain some characteristics on how we take decisions and, in
particular, how we vote. However, studies of actual electoral data with the
current tools in physics are scarce [Borghesi et al, 2006, Borghesi et al, 2010,
Borghesi et al, 2012a, Borghesi et al, 2012b, Costa Filho et al, 2006] [Fortunato et al, 2007,
Herna´ndez, 2009, Herrmann et al, 2004]. The current work is part of an effort
to fulfill such an absence and contribute to characterize the statistical proper-
ties of actual databases. Certainly, all these approaches are complimentary
to the vast literature and studies done in political, social, economical and
anthropological sciences.
Here, we are interested in a particular kind of electoral forensics related
with the reliability of vote processes. The faithfulness of the data is an
important issue, since the record of social processes is subject to all kinds
of uncontrollable factors. Furthermore, while data considered for analysis in
physics are subject to a careful understanding of the sources of error, such
analysis are almost absent in studies of voting process even though election
forensics is a current subject in political sciences.
In this work, we present an approach to two problems: we analyze the
real time results obtained during the federal election in Mexico in the year
of 2006, and we offer an analysis of the distribution of errors obtainable
from this public database. Both problems contribute to clarify the dynamics
in the Mexican electoral processes, where a misunderstanding of the data
give place to suspicious of the existence of a large fraud (Mega-fraud). We
present statistical arguments that limit such a suspicious, gives a better per-
spective of the peculiarities of the Mexican processes where the nonexistence
of widespread fraud does not necessarily mean absence of irregularities. We
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offer, as well, evidence that usual statistical assumptions are not necessarily
fulfilled by the electoral processes. The reported forensics in the peer re-
viewed literature does not consider the tests analyzed here. On the other
hand, we do not consider the pre-election events and how they influenced the
final result.
We focus the present study on data obtained from the “Program of Pre-
liminary Electoral Results”, or PREP, after its acronym in Spanish [PREP, 2006],
which is the system implemented by the electoral authorities (Instituto Fed-
eral Electoral, IFE) in order to present the first results as the information
arrives to the headquarters. In Mexico, the election is performed using elec-
toral cabins (polling stations) that admit, by construction, around 750 voters
and that are, approximately, uniformly distributed over the population with
the right to emit a vote. The PREP works with certificates stamped on the
packets of ballots (named electoral packets). In those certificates the citizens
who staff polling places write, by hand, the number of votes received for
each party, total number of those votes, etc., at the end of the electoral day.
Later, the authorities of each electoral cabin deliver the electoral packets
and their certificates to the capture centers. The time of arrival is captured
as well as the results stamped on the electoral packets. The records are
sent to Mexico City headquarters and published on the electoral authorities’
website [http://www.ife.org.mx, 2006]. The final results are recorded in
a public file [PREP, 2006]. The analysis presented here is based on such a
file. During the next days IFE admits and discusses objections and appel-
lations. The final results are published in the final count named “Conteo
Distrital” or District Count. Disputes about electoral practices are solved
by the autonomous Federal Electoral Tribunal. Analysis on statistical as-
pects of distrital count results are in progress and some have been published
[Herna´ndez, 2009, Herna´ndez, 2010, Herna´ndez, 2011].
Federal elections in Mexico are performed each six years on the first
Sunday of July, including presidential change and renewal of both cham-
bers. For details on how the Mexican electoral systems works see the note
of Klesner [Klesner, 2007]. An important result is the conformation of the
chambers, that depends in a complicated way on the alliances and the relative
strength of each political current, see Crespo for an explanation [Crespo, 2011].
The political parties who participated in the July 2006 election are grouped
in two alliances and several parties. The first party is Partido Accio´n Na-
cional (PAN) postulating as candidate to Felipe Caldero´n Hinojosa (FCH);
the first alliance corresponds to Alianza por Me´xico composed of the Par-
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tido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the Partido Verde Ecologista
de Me´xico (PVEM), they postulated Roberto Madrazo Pintado (RMP); the
second alliance was Alianza por el bien de todos composed of the follow-
ing political parties: Partido de la Revolucio´n Democra´tica (PRD), Partido
del Trabajo (PT) and Convergencia, with candidate Andre´s Manuel Lo´pez
Obrador (AMLO); the last parties are Partido Nueva Alianza with Roberto
Campa Cifria´n (RCC) and, Partido Alternativa to Patricia Mercado Cas-
tro (PMC). The certificates report votes for non registered candidates and
annulled votes as well. For the alliances we shall use the main party to iden-
tify them, that is we shall call PRI instead of Alianza por Me´xico and PRD
instead of Alianza por el bien de todos.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we
clarify our lines of argument. We establish the working hypothesis and the
alternative one. In section 3, we analyze correlations in the real-time be-
havior of PREP data. For section 4, we perform an analysis on the six
independent self-consistent error distributions that can be build up with the
PREP data. As bonus we describe the vote distribution for all the cases in
section 5. Conclusions appear in section 6 and some additional information
in an appendix.
2. The argumentative line
The Mexican presidential election in 2006 was controversial and suspicions
of a large (Mega) fraud has been present since election day. This was at
the origin of our interest in analyzing electoral data. However, our lack of
expertise in electoral matters shall rule the statistical approach we use. Even
when we have experience analyzing statistical properties of complex physical
systems, we do not have a clear idea of how a Mega-fraud in elections must
looks like. Under this premise, a serious working hypothesis is to depart from
the idea that no fraud exists and to perform as many test as we are able, in
order to find a qualitative difference in the results of all the cases we shall
present.
As pointed out by Good and Harding [Good, 2004], it is a source of error
to “[use] the same set of data to formulate hypothesis and then to test those
hypothesis”. Since the data set under suspicion is the presidential election
of 2006, we shall contrast all our test with the chambers election of the same
year. We complement our results with the analysis of presidential election in
Mexico during 2000.
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Hence, our working hypothesis is established as:
H1 : Data from PREP for the Mexican elections of 2006, presidential and
both chambers, present the same qualitative statistical behavior.
The alternative hypothesis is:
H0 : Data from PREP for the Mexican elections of 2006, presidential and
both chambers, present a qualitative different statistical behavior.
This means, that manipulation in a large scale is present in one of the
cases. The meaning of “qualitative difference” will be clear in the section of
error distributions. Notice that these hypothesis do not depend on what we
expect or not, according to our prejudices. For instance, for physicists it is
natural to expect error distributions with a Gaussian or a Lorentzian shape.
But, in the present case, we are not dealing with the same objects (particles)
or interactions. So, deviations from the canonical, uncorrelated, behavior do
not to be assumed as a signature of fraud when appear in different processes.
The philosophy is that before we look what is out of place, we look, first,
what is in place. Hence, our study is of a phenomenological nature.
3. Time behavior of PREP
Around 20 : 00 hrs on July 2nd, 2006, the Program of Preliminary Elec-
toral Results (PREP) of IFE [PREP, 2006] began to publish on its website
the vote percentages for the presidential election of that day. The update was
every 5 minutes and the news services reproduced it. A very close election,
according to opinion polls, was expected between the two main candidates of
PAN and PRD. (Recall we shall use the names of the main political parties in
a coalition). At the beginning, the tendency showed a decrease in the number
of votes for the PAN’s candidate and an increase for the candidate of PRD.
At first sight, a crossing seemed to be imminent between the percentage of
votes obtained by the two candidates. For this reason, several scientists as
well as laymen started the capture of real-time data using different methods,
some captured by hand, others captured automatically with programs like
perl [Mochan, 2006, Baqueiro, 2006].
In Fig. 1(a) we show the plot of the real-time data given by the PREP for
the three main candidates captured in election day [Baqueiro, 2006] as well
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as the data obtained from the PREP file (in lines at the figure). This plot
shows roughly two tendencies for the percentage obtained by the candidate of
PRD. The increasing tendency changed to a decreasing one around 3:00 AM
(around 70% of the processed vote certificates in Fig. 1) of July 3rd. As can
be seen in the same figure, the PRI candidate increased its vote percentage
changing the tendencies of the candidates of PAN and PRD, respectively.
As a result, no crossing between the vote percentage of the two main can-
didates was found with the PREP in real time. In order to test the suspicious
that real time data published in the web page of IFE is not coincident with
the reported data in the PREP file, we plotted both of them in Figure 1(a),
and they agree.
A common belief is to consider that the behavior of a graph like Figure 1
reaches its final value in a direct way, and a change like the presented here
looks suspicious. However, one must be careful, since we cannot consider a
priori uncorrelated behavior. The graph shows vote percentage and, evidently,
this fact introduces correlations between the variables as we shall explain. For
the sake of clarity we drop the multiplication by 100. The percentage of votes
for party 1, for instance, at certain time t or percentage of processed vote
certificates is calculated by
%V1(t) =
V1(t)∑N
i Vi(t)
, (1)
and for party 2,
%V2(t) =
V2(t)∑N
i Vi(t)
. (2)
Here Vi(t) corresponds to the number of votes received by party i at time
t. Eliminating the common expression
∑N
i Vi(t) between both equations we
have
%V1(t) =
V1(t)
V2(t)
×%V2(t). (3)
This correlates the percentage %V1(t) with the precentage %V2(t), not mat-
tering that the variables V1(t) and V2(t) are random or not. The same is true
for the rest of the percentages and for all times. Additionally, the percentage
of all the parties must sum 100% as well, hence, it is natural that a “mirror”
effect appears in normalized quantities. In Figure 1(b) we show the percent-
age of vote for the rest of the parties, notice that the values do not present
significant changes, hence, the changes are due to the three main parties.
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Figure 1: (Color on-line) Real-time data given by the Program of Preliminary Electoral
Results (PREP) for (a) the three main presidential candidates and (b) the other two
candidates, the votes for non registered candidates and the annulled votes (NULL). The
plots in (a) show the percentage of votes obtained per candidate against the percentage of
processed vote certificates. The blue circles correspond to Felipe Caldero´n Hinojosa (FCH),
candidate of PAN, the green triangles to Roberto Madrazo Pintado (RMP) for PRI, and
the orange diamonds to Andre´s Manuel Lo´pez Obrador for the PRD party. The data were
taken from the Internet [Mochan, 2006, Baqueiro, 2006] and correspond to the real time
data published by IFE’s web page. We added 10% of votes to RPM in order to show all
the results in a smaller window. Notice the change in the slope of this party after the 70%
of processed certificates. We show the complete data from the PREP file[PREP, 2006]
as well, they are indicated by the corresponding lines. From the same data set we plot,
in (b), the percentages obtained for Roberto Campa Cifria´n (RCC) for PANAL, Patricia
Mercado for Partido Alternativa, we included the vote for non registered candidates (NON
REG.) and annulled votes (NULL). Notice that the change in the percentages, for these
cases, is small.
Moreover, the temporal data are not taken from a uniform sample and
so we do not expect a fast convergence to the final results. Assuming a
clean election, the first data that arrived to the capture centers were from
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sites with better transport networks and/or a better vote counting perfor-
mance. In Ref. [Pliego, 2007], correlation with an official marginalization in-
dex [CONAPO, 2005] is presented and confirms this assertion: Reports from
polling stations inside regions with a low marginalization index arrived early
to capture centers. In an earlier version of this paper1 we presented examples
of how the sampling of polling stations rules the shape of the percentage vote
graph [Ba´ez et al, 2006]. Evidently, the final values are the same.
The question that remains is: Does it show some peculiar behavior the
number of votes? A way to answer it is to calculate the correlation ma-
trix, and particularly the auto-correlation. In Table 1 we report both, the
correlations for percentage of votes in the lower triangular matrix and the
correlations for the number votes in the upper triangular matrix. Recall that
correlation matrices are symmetric. In the diagonal we report the result of
auto-correlations for percentage of votes, the corresponding auto-correlation
in number of vote are equal to one in all the cases.
For the lower triangular matrix, the correlation in percentage of votes
shows the obvious relation between them, the vast majority is far from zero
and near one or minus one. An exception in the case of the presidential
candidate of PANAL, RCC, whose auto-correlation is 0.08(i.e. it is not auto-
correlated!). Other anomalies appear with this party and are reported below.
Note that not all the auto-correlations in Table 1 are unity, since the percent-
age and its momenta are calculated prior to calculating each correlation and
a large variability in the PREP records exists. These statistics are reported
in section 4.
The correlation matrix of percentage of votes for deputies and senators
election are presented in the appendix in Tables 3 and 4. The results are
similar to those presented in 1: percentage of votes are correlated (or anti-
correlated). An interesting point is that PANAL’s percentage of vote auto-
correlation is 0.71 and 0.62 for deputies and senators, far from the 0.08 for
presidential election.
For the number of votes, as expected, the story is different. The vast ma-
jority of correlations reported are close to zero and all the auto-correlations
of votes are one. Even the correlation of PANAL with other parties is around
1The first version of this paper was made public the 13/Sept/2006, at the arxiv site
http://arxiv.org/abs/phys/0609114. This site offers preprints in a free way and it is
maintained by the University of Cornell.
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PAN PRI PRD PANAL Alter N.R. N.V.
PAN 1.00 -0.05 -0.23 0.07 0.35 0.08 -0.06
PRI -0.77 1.00 -0.15 0.10 -0.17 0.07 0.18
PRD -0.74 0.15 1.02 -0.02 0.34 0.01 0.00
PANAL -0.26 0.17 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.08
Alter 0.70 -0.96 -0.07 -0.16 1.00 0.12 -0.06
N.R. 0.11 0.06 -0.25 -0.03 -0.04 0.82 0.03
N.V. -0.95 0.81 0.62 0.25 -0.78 -0.19 1.00
Table 1: Correlation matrix of vote percentage, lower triangular matrix, and number of
votes, upper triangular, for the presidential election in 2006. Diagonal corresponds to
auto-correlation of vote percentage. Notice the anomalous value of the auto-correlation in
the PANAL case. N.R. stands for non registered candidates and N.V. for annulled votes.
zero. The values calculated for the chambers are all consistent with this re-
sult: There is no a qualitative difference in the presidential and chambers
elections.
A test on the statistical significance of the correlation coefficients can be
done using a re-sampling method [Good, 2005]. However we found much
more instructive to show the behavior of the errors in the database. Which
is the matter of the next section.
Returning to the percentage of votes behavior, we analyze the deputies
and senators behavior. In Figure 2 we report the equivalent plots of Fig. 1
for the Chambers. In Fig. 2(a) and(c) for deputies meanwhile in (b) and (d)
for Senators. The behavior reported for the presidential data is similar in
the current case, except that the apparent crossover is not present since the
percentages of vote are different. For the 2000 election the behavior is similar
and the results for the three main candidates is presented in Fig. 9 at the
appendix. It is interesting that a shift (not shown) on the data reproduce
the global behavior in the 2006 case, i.e. the growth of the PRI percentage
of vote around 70% of vote certificates and the falling of percentage of votes
for PRD and PAN before that.
4. Conservation laws in elections
Another way to test the reliability of the electoral processes is to check
the self-consistency of the data-base. In the cabin certificates several data are
recorded and several of them must agree. For instance the total number of
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Figure 2: (Color on-line) Same as the previous figure but for election of both chambers.
Here the data were obtained from PREP file and we do not have the results published in
real time in IFE’s web page. In (a) percentage of votes for the three main parties/coalitions
for the deputies election and in (b) for the high chamber. Except for the scales the behavior
is similar to the presidential case. A shift (not shown) of the percentage of votes for PAN
and PRD for both chambers present the same non-crossing effect as in previous figure.
Notice, as well, that PRI have a revival around the 70% of processeed vote certificates in
both cases. In (c) and (d) we plot the results for the rest of the parties, non registered and
annulled votes for deputies and senators, respectively. Notice that the global behavior in
(a) and (b) is similar to figure 1(a). That is: vote for the chambers follows the presidential
behavior.
ballots received the election day must be equal to the number of the remaining
ballots plus the used ones. In an ideal election such kind of quantities must
give zero for all the cabin records, however we are dealing with an actual
process performed by people and some errors could occur, intentional or not.
In many processes Gaussian or lorentzian distributions of error appear but
in the current case we have no a priori knowledge about the distribution or
if the whole amount of votes are enough to reach the limit distribution, if
it exists. So, as explained in the argumentative line section, we define and
explore the errors that could give us self-consistency in the database and
contrast all of them.
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Figure 3: (Color on-line) Error distributions, in logarithmic scale, of the difference between
the total ballots received Br and the sum of the remaining ballots Bs and the total number
of voters V per cabin, E1 = Br-(Bs+V), for all the cases in July 2006 election. Negative
values in the horizontal axis mean more votes than ballots, i.e. there were more voters
than documents which certified this fact, and positive values mean appearance of ballots,
but in both cases there is no conservation of the total number of received ballots Br per
cabin. The inset shows the left branch of the distribution in log-log scale. This shows a
power law decay. Note the several sharp peaks in the distribution along the horizontal
axis between the values 10 to 100. We assume that these peaks are related with typos,
but further analysis is required. We note that the distribution for senators show a slightly
different behavior in its left branch, compared with the corresponding distributions for
president and deputies. The distributions are not normalized.
The PREP database is composed from the data stamped in the electoral
package by the citizens sorted by IFE to conduct the election at the polling
station, several of them are easily subject to human error or to intentional
alteration and, its distributions must be object of study. The data are: Total
number of received ballots at the beginning of the electoral process (Br),
number of remaining (not used) ballots (Bs), number of voters (V), number
of deposited ballots per cabin (Bd) and the number of votes received for
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E1 B. received − (B. not used + Number of voters) Br - (Bs + V)
E2 B. received − (B. not used + B. deposited) Br - (Bs + Bd)
E3 B. received − (B. not used + Votes for each party) Br - (Bs+
∑
i Vi)
E4 Number of voters − B. deposited V - Bd
E5 Number of voters − Votes for each party V -
∑
i Vi
E6 B. deposited − Votes for each party Bd -
∑
i Vi
Table 2: Table of errors considered for a self consistency test of the PREP database. The
quantities considered are those that were calculated and registered independently by the
electoral authorities (citizens) when the votes were counted. In this sense, they are non-
trivial. We use B. as a shorthand for Ballots. The variable i stands for the number of
votes obtained for each party/candidate.
each party/candidate (Vi, i = PAN, PRI, PRD, PANAL, ALTENATIVA,
non-registered candidates and annulled votes). The conservation laws that
we checked, for self-consistency, are six and they are summarized in table 2.
The error distribution is build up by calculating the error Ek on each cabin
and, then, make the histogram of the values obtained, i.e., how many cabins
have values of Ek equal to 0,1,2,· · ·. Certainly the values can be negatives as
well. In the current work we do not normalize the distributions.
We start the analysis with E1, that is, the total number of ballots, Br,
against the sum of the number of remaining ballots, Bs, and the number of
voters per cabin, V, i.e ., E1 = Br-(Bs+V). As seen in Fig. 3, the distribution
of E1 is peaked around zero but is neither the expected Dirac delta function
δ(x), nor a Gaussian nor a Lorentzian. Data on the positive axis mean
appearance of ballots, meanwhile data on the negative axis indicate lost of
them. In plain English, in the latter case there are more registered people
who voted than documents that certified their existence. Zooms in different
parts of this distribution show the following facts: (1) The PREP preserve
this number for only ∼ 45% of the cabins. This result is unfortunate for
the electoral authorities (IFE) since it says that PREP reliability is less
than 50%. This is even worse since, as we shall see later, the same occurs
for the rest of the error distributions considered and in the distributions
for both chambers. (2) The distribution is not completely symmetric. In
particular the peak around −250 is higher than the peak at 250. (3) There
are inconsistencies larger than 750 votes for several cabins. (4) There are
peaks at ±10,±20, . . . and also at ±100,±200, . . .. These peaks, we assume,
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Figure 4: (Color on-line) Error distributions, in logarithmic scale, of the difference between
the total ballots received Br minus the sum of the ballots remained Bs plus the ballots
deposited in urns Bd by cabin, i.e., E2 = Br-(Bs+Bd). Notice that the asymmetry between
the both branches for the three distributions is similar, but it is different from that in
previous figure. Again, the left branch of this probability distributions shows the sharp
peaks we associated to capture mistakes. The inset shows both branches of the distributions
in log-log scale.
are related with capture typos, but it is not proved. (5) The peak at the left
side of the distribution shows a different behavior for senators than the other
cases. (6) The distribution between 1 and 100 decays as a power law as can
be seen in the insert of figures 3 to 5.
In Figs. 4 and 5 we show the distributions of E2 and E3 conservation laws.
Both distributions should give a delta function δ(x) in the ideal case. But,
as seen in Figure 4, it is very asymmetric and present extreme values around
750 as in Fig. 3. In the insets we show that typos are also present and that
power laws appear. The results for E4 and E5 are similar.
In the previous analysis all the cabins were considered, notwithstanding
the fact that a selection is required, since many records present alterations
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as was documented by Crespo [Crespo,2008]. However, statistical analysis,
like the present one are valid, since the universal source of error must be
studied for future references. Other errors, random or systematic, require
future analysis as well.
The result of presidential 2006 election caused a debate about the exis-
tence or not of a Mega-fraud against the candidate of PRD and this section
offers a new insight into the question. Since the error distributions of all the
cases have a similar behavior, we have only two options: i) There was no
large fraud in presidential election, or ii) There was a large fraud in all the
cases, including both chambers.
In order to differentiate between the previous options we calculated the
same error distributions for the PREP corresponding to the presidential elec-
tion in 2000. We summarize the results in Fig. 6. As can be seen, the main
characteristics of whole election in 2006 are present in the 2000 election.
Nobody mentioned a fraud or a mega-fraud then, but certainly the present
results tell something about the dynamics in Mexican elections. The large
amount of errors and vicious practices certainly are present in both elections,
and requires of a separate analysis. It is important to remark that it is not
only the amount of errors important, the distributions show the dynamics and
hopefully an analysis of them will provide us a better understanding of the
human processes that an election imply. Aparicio [Aparicio, 2006] reports
that the percentage of errors are similar in the presidential elections in 2000
and 2006, but here we offer new tools to understand such a behavior. For in-
stance, even when the amount of received ballots at each cabin is around 750,
the reported quantity present large deviations, many of them, probably, due
to carelesnes of the citizen authorities record. If this is of a malicious origin
is unclear but opens the opportunity for new analysis. Another point is that
performing sums under pressure could be a no trivial matter. Measuring the
distribution of such behaviors is an open task to social scientists and suggest
the performance of experiments as well. allows to perform experiments as
well. For example, to design an experiment to obtain the distribution of
typos under pressure in the capture line. To the knowledge of the authors
this distribution has not been reported in the literature. The meaning of the
lobes with maximum around ±250 must be analyzed as well as the power
law decay in all the studied cases.
As a final remark of this section, we note that with the large amount of
errors the result in the presidential election of 2006 could remain unclear and
a technical tie. However, analysis similar to the presented here, including
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Figure 5: (Color on-line) Error distributions, in logarithmic scale, for the difference be-
tween the total ballots received Br minus the sum of the ballots remaining Bs plus the
sum of votes obtained by each political party, including null votes
∑
i
Vi, that is E3 =
Br-(Bs+
∑
i
Vi). The meaning of the right and the left distribution branches is similar
to that in figure 3. Notice that the three distributions are similar. The inset shows both
branches of the distributions in log-log scale.
the chambers election and comparison with other electoral but equivalent
processes, is useful in order to clarify the forensics of fraud or not in future
elections, in Mexico or in any democracy.
5. Distribution of the votes
As a final study we deal with the histograms of the number of elec-
toral cabins (polling stations) with a certain number of votes shown in
Fig. 7. These histograms are the non normalized vote distribution for each
party/candidate. The results for PAN,PRI and PRD presidential candidates
appear in Fig. 7(a) and the corresponding results for deputies and senators
in panels (b) and (c). Panel (d) of this figure corresponds to PANAL, Alter-
nativa, non-registered candidates and null votes for the presidential election.
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Figure 6: (Color on-line) All error distributions for the presidential election in 2000. The
meaning of Ei are reported in Table 2. Date were taken from the corresponding PREP
file. In order to see all the cases in the same plot we multiply resulting distribution by
a factor of one hundred each time. As seen in the plot the global behavior is similar to
those appeared in the whole 2006 electoral process. The scale in y-axis is logarithmic.
Histograms for the votes of PRI change very slowly in the three cases
(Fig. 7(a) to (c)). The tail of these distributions looks exponential (a fit
is shown in Fig. 8). This is not the case for the distributions of the two
main presidential candidates (Fig. 7(a)). The distribution of the votes for
FCH/PAN shows a very different behavior for electoral cabins with less than
∼ 40 votes, since it starts flat. The distribution for AMLO/PRD is also
irregular. It shows three different regimes. It appears like a distribution in
which realizations between 60 and 300 votes are missing. This could be due
to two reasons: the first, is that the data were manipulated; the second,
is that the distribution of the votes for PRD is composed of two or more
distributions corresponding to several voter dynamics [Merlin et al, 2004].
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Figure 7: Histograms showing the number of electoral cabins whith given number of votes
for the three main parties, (a) president, (b) deputies, (c) senators. In (d) the results
votes for president by the small parties are given. Note that the P2 distribution have an
exponential tail while the distribution of the small parties show a shifted power-law.
As an example, a weighted sum of two distributions
P = pPDaisy(〈v1〉, σ1) + (1− p)Plog−normal(〈v2〉, σ2) (4)
with different centroids, 〈v1〉 and 〈v2〉, like a Daisy model (see below) and
a log-normal distribution could give place to such deformed distributions.
Both functions correspond to different groups of voters, the first one to cor-
porate voters [Herna´ndez, 2009] and the other to certain proportional elec-
tions [Fortunato et al, 2007]. The distributions for the senators and deputies
present similar behavior as seen in Fig. 7 (b) and (c). In fact, the participa-
tion of a uniform group of voter in important elections is, a priori, unlikely;
so, it is enough to have two kind of voters following distribution with different
maxima to have such a behavior. This topic is matter of current research by
one of us.
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The histograms for the parties with a small number of votes are given
in Fig. 7(d). As seen, all histograms have a similar behavior, except for a
small numbers of votes. All are shifted power-laws, except for the PANAL
presidential candidate which presents deviations. The results for deputies
and senators for the same parties are similar (not shown). These results
can be explained with several models of cluster growth in complex net-
works [Costa Filho et al, 2006, Fortunato et al, 2007], for instance, and ap-
pear in other electoral processes [Costa Filho et al, 1999, Herrmann et al, 2004]
for proportional votes. All these stidies are in search of a universal dynamics
in voting processes. A research along these lines for the Mexican elections
is in progress. We found an inconsistency in the tail of the annulled votes.
This distribution shows several electoral cabins with more than 100 annulled
votes. The probability of having such results is negligible, so that these re-
sults are not statistical, i.e., they are the result of negligence or of a malicious
act.
Finally, we return to the PRI case. The distribution of votes for this party
is clearly smooth and a fit using the so called Daisy models [Herna´ndez et al, 1999]
was performed previously on the final records (Distrital count) for Mexican
elections in 2000, 2003 and 2006 [Herna´ndez, 2009]. The corresponding fit
for the presidential PREP data corresponds to a rank r = 3 model
P3(s) =
44
3!
s3 exp(−4s), (5)
for the distribution’s central part, and an r = 2 model
P2(s) =
33
2!
s2 exp(−3s), (6)
for the tail. A plot on the normalized distribution of votes appears in Fig-
ure 8. Here the “unfolding” of votes is performed using a 4th degree poly-
nomial on windows of 300 and 3000 cabin certificates obtaining a reliable
average density of events 2. Notice that no fitting parameter was used, in
contrast to a Brody or a Weibull distributions. The reason of this behavior is
unclear and requires a local analysis of the distribution in order to separate
the states and municipalities ruled traditionally by PRI. A connection with
a geographical approach could be of interest [Sua´rez et al, 2011]
2The “unfolding” procedure and their meaning is explained in [Herna´ndez, 2010] but
is of standard use in data analysis long ago.
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Figure 8: Unfolded distribution for a randomly shuffled sequence of votes for the P2
presidential candidate (green line). A daisy model of rank r = 2 and 3 (see text for
details) are shown in dashed and continuous black lines.
6. Conclusions
We studied some statistical properties of the federal Mexican elections
using the Program of Preliminary Electoral Results (PREP) database from
2000 and 2006. Our main goal was to test reliability in electoral processes,
mainly in a controversial election where people suspect of a Mega-fraud.
Since we do not have previous experience in electoral data and we do not
know how specifically a Mega-fraud must look we chose to test the hypothesis:
H1 : Data from PREP for the Mexican elections of 2006, presidential and
both chambers, present the same qualitative statistical behavior.
And the alternative one:
H0 : Data from PREP for the Mexican elections of 2006, presidential and
both chambers, present a qualitative different statistical behavior.
We did tried our best effort to test these hypothesis.
The first suspicion of cheating behavior was the non crossing between the
vote percentage of AMLO and FCH in the real time data. We demonstrate
that the percentage of votes are correlated while the number of votes are not.
The change in slope is strongly altered by the PRI increase of the number
of votes around the 70% of the processed vote certificates. This behaviour is
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reproduced in both chambers election of the same year and in the presidential
election in 2000. This contradicts hypothesis H0 for the time behavior.
A second test concerns the self consistency of the data-set that appears
in the PREP file. For an ideal case the sum of votes for all party/candidates
and the remaining ballots must be equal to the number of ballots received at
the poll station in the election day, for instance. From the set of data in the
file six different and independent test of self consistency can be constructed
(see 2 ). All of them can be subject of error, from a honest human mistake
to a cheating alteration in many of the known ways. Hence we built up the
error distribution, which consist of the histogram of the selected error for all
the cabins records. We found a similar global behavior in all the cases, for
the presidential election in 2006, which is under suspicion of fraud, for both
chambers election in the same year and, in the presidential election in 2000.
The later was assumed as a clean or at least not disputed election for the
participants. In all the cases, the error distributions have a central peak with
a power law decay in, approximately, the interval from −50 to 50. All of them
have a lobe around ±300 or ±400, but generally asymmetric. Some revivals
or peaks in±10, ±20,. . ., appear in the 2006 cases and they are less prominent
in the presidential election of 2000. We suspect of typos for this kind of
errors, but, as all the characteristics presented in the current paper, these
must be tested with experiments and with new evidence. For instance, at our
best knowledge, there is no distribution of typos under pressure conditions.
Hence for the self consistency test no large deviations were observed and, H1
is confirmed.
Even with the evidence provided here and in the peer reviwed literature
it is possible the existence of a large fraud, but the probability of such a
case is small. Clarification of July 2006 presidential election in Mexico is
of a historical importance and hence requiere of more analysis. What we
consider much more interesting at this is to insist that electoral processes
are subject to a lot of errors and comparisons with theoretical models and
predictions must take this fact in to account. We offered, that is our hope,
new ways to tipify errors. It is not enough to talk about the magnitude
of the errors, since a dynamics inside exists. We leave to an ulterior work
comments on the way the cheating could appear in the error distributions.
For instance, another explanation for the peaks in such a distributions is that
the party representative altered the vote record by adding a zero to the total
votes obtained by their own party, transforming a 7 into 70, for instance.
Or how the errors are distributed along the maginalization index?. Are they
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distributed in the same way or are different?. How to the different and well
know malicious behaviour apperars in these distributions?
As a final remark, we also have obtained the distributions of votes for
the different parties. In particular, the distribution of the party that was in
power in Mexico during more than 70 years behaves smoothly. Daisy models
of 2nd and 3rd rank seem to fit different parts of the measured distribution.
In contrast, the distributions of the parties with more votes are more complex
and, probably, composed of different voters dynamics. Distributions of small
parties follow power laws. This behavior is consistent with several theoretical
models.
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8. Appendix: Additional data
In this appendix we present additional data, required for comparison. In
tables 3 and 4 appear the correlations for percentage of vote (lower matrix)
and for number of votes (upper matrix). The correlations were calculated
using the standard method
c(x, y) =
1
N
N∑
i
xˆ(i)yˆ(i), (7)
where
xˆ(i) = (x(i)− x¯)/
√
V ar(x), (8)
for the corresponding variable, the number of votes or the percentage of them,
for all the combinations of political parties.
In Figure 9 the time behaviour of PREP file during July 2000 is shown.In
this case, the PRI appears in second place, but with a change in its slope
around 70% of polling stations processed. Shifting these percentages in or-
der to show them as in july 2000 presidential election resembles the same
bahavior. The shifting is not shown. Notice that in this figure as well as in
all in the paper consider all the data available.
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PAN PRI PRD PANAL Alter N.R. N.V.
PAN 1.00 0.06 -0.3 0.22 0.22 0.00 -0.04
PRI -0.45 1.02 -0.19 0.02 -0.18 0.00 0.13
PRD -0.82 -0.16 1.02 0.18 0.41 0.05 0.03
PANAL 0.42 -0.76 0.01 0.71 0.36 0.05 0.02
ALTER 0.48 -0.97 0.08 0.79 1.00 0.06 -0.02
N.R. -0.84 0.22 0.78 -0.26 -0.27 0.90 0.02
N.V. 0.91 0.42 0.72 -0.52 -0.51 0.81 1.00
Table 3: Correlation matrix of vote percentage, lower triangle, and number of votes, upper
triangle, for the deputies election in 2006. Diagonal corresponds to auto-correlation of
vote percentage. N.R. stands for non registered candidates and N.V. for annulled votes.
PAN PRI PRD PANAL Alter I.C. N.V.
PAN 1.00 0.08 -0.31 0.20 0.21 0.01 -0.05
PRI -0.62 1.02 -0.22 -0.03 -0.19 -0.00 0.12
PRD -0.83 0.06 1.02 0.28 0.40 0.02 0.03
PANAL 0.28 -0.71 0.14 0.62 0.45 0.06 0.00
ALTER 0.22 -0.86 0.34 0.73 1.00 0.06 -0.02
I.C. -0.50 0.49 0.27 -0.32 -0.38 0.76 0.02
N.V. -0.93 0.62 0.73 -0.36 -0.32 0.53 1.00
Table 4: Correlation matrix of vote percentage, lower triangle, and number of votes, upper
triangle, for senatorial election in 2006. Diagonal corresponds to auto-correlation of vote
percentage. N.R. stands for non registered candidate s and N.V. for annulled votes.
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